We explore the economic impact of boycotts of French automobiles in China during the time of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Conditions were favorable for a boycott, enabling Chinese consumers to overcome the collective action problems that can prevent boycott success and other voluntary contributions to public goods. We use brand and model level data in a difference-indifference specification to investigate the boycotts' effects on sales. A robust pattern of large impacts emerges: sales of French automobile brands fell 25-33 percent or more. Consumers substituted mostly toward Chinese and other Asian cars. The sales of the French models did not experience similar relative sales declines in countries other than China-triple-difference estimates point toward even larger relative loss of market share in China. Our results provide evidence that commerce can be used as an effective political weapon.
Introduction
Attempts to boycott consumer products to protest a firm's business decisions or a country's political actions are frequent today. In the US, more than half of top brands have been boycotted. 1 1 John and Klein (2003) cite statistics showing that 54% of top brands face calls for boycotts and that boycotts increased about fourfold from the 1980s to the 1990s. See Table A1 in the appendix for a list of recent boycotts. matched to non-French models with similar characteristics) yield substantially similar patterns but with even larger magnitudes.
We also explore the substitution behavior of consumers, since buyers are likely to switch to substitute brands of other origin when they boycott French automobiles. As would be expected given the circumstances of the boycott, the estimations show that buyers substitute toward Chinese and other Asian brands, not brands from other Western countries. Thus, it appears that the anger of Chinese consumers spilled over to other Western automobile brands in this respect. Finally, we investigate whether the French automaker's sales decline in China occurred in other countries as well, and find that it did not.
The present work contributes to three distinct strands of the economics literature: the empirical bodies of research that assess the impact of boycotts, examine contributions to public goods, and perform industry studies. Most of the earlier work on the financial impact of boycotts examines the stock prices of targeted firms. Results are mixed. Certain studies find that the valuation of a firm falls due to a boycott (Davidson et al. 1995) , sometimes even in response to its announcement (Pruitt and Friedman, 1986) . Other studies find either no effect or anomalous positive effects of boycotts on stock prices (Koku et al., 1997; Teoh et al., 1999) , or yield mixed evidence within the same study (Epstein and Schnietz, 2002) . These studies thus indicate that boycott success is highly variable.
There is also variability in the conclusions drawn on the success of a specific boycott. The three previous studies of boycott participation examining product-level sales look at the US consumer boycott of French wines in 2003 stemming from France's lack of support for the invasion of Iraq led by the US. Two of these papers find that, after controlling for other factors and trends, the boycott did not significantly reduce sales of French wines (Ashenfelter et al., 2007; Bentzen and Smith, 2007) , while Leslie and Chavis (2009) conclude that it did. The present work is the first econometric examination (of which we are aware) of a boycott with microdata on sales for a product other than wine. 2 Consequently, it is also the first to examine boycott success in terms of sales for a good that represents a major expenditure for most households.
nonrival, as in the present case where the perceived benefits of the boycott come from asserting Chinese nationalism and self-determination on the world's stage. Nationalism itself is also a public good (Breton, 1964) , in which individuals can invest through certain acts-boycotting French products, in the present case. Thus our paper contributes to the economic literature on voluntary contributions to public goods in general (Ostrom, 2000) and to nationalism in particular (Breton, 1964; Pagano, 1995) . We are aware of little econometric work on the economics of nationalism, although study of the economic effects of nationalist boycotts in China has a long history stemming from Orchard (1930) and Remer (1979) , who examine boycotts in the pre-communist era. Closest in spirit to the present work is that of Michaels and Zhi (2010) , who investigate the impact of anti-French political sentiments in the US in 2003 on the input purchasing decisions of US firms, and find that much of the 10-12% decrease in US-French trade was due to reduced trade in firms' inputs.
The present work also contributes to the empirical industrial organization literature on industry studies. In particular, ours is only the second econometric examination of which we are aware analyzing market sales in the Chinese automobile industry, after Deng and Ma (2010) .
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the causes, timing, and target of the boycott in China are presented. We present factors that portend the success of a boycott, and show that there are many theoretical reasons to expect that the Chinese boycott of French products would be successful. Section 2 also includes a description of the Chinese automobile industry. In section 3, we describe the sources and data we use, and present the results of the empirical investigation demonstrating that the boycotts had a large impact on the sales of French automobiles in China. A final section summarizes why alternative explanations are unlikely and concludes.
Causes, Timing, and Target of the Boycott

The Economics of Boycotts
At first glance, the existence of successful boycotts presents a puzzle to economists. As a form of collective action, boycott participation is subject to the problems associated with small agents and free riding. Any instrumental conception of a boycott, in which the action is meant to influence the behavior of the boycotted firm, must struggle with the fact that individual consumers are typically so small in the market that it is irrational for any one buyer to believe that he would have any noticeable impact on the profits of the firm (John and Klein, 2003) . Since participating in a boycott entails a utility cost from the forgone consumption, participation is therefore not likely to be individually rational. Furthermore, since an individual will share the benefits from a successful boycott regardless of participation, free riding is a tempting option. However, just as people vote despite the Voting Paradox, people boycott. 4 For the event we examine, the theoretical literature on boycotts (Friedman, 1999; John and Klein, 2003) suggests several factors that prime a Chinese boycott of French automobiles for success: the cost of participation is low, the perceived harm from the egregious acts is high, the motives of expressing anger and the desire to punish are present, the value placed on conformity in Chinese culture may be high, 5 and nonparticipants can be identified easily. Furthermore, the French automobile company is likely to be an effective surrogate for the French government, whose behavior the boycotters wish to modify. The more political influence the boycott target has, the more likely the government will cease the egregious acts (Friedman, 1999, p.30) . In the case of a surrogate boycott of French products, automobiles therefore make a tempting target, since PSA Peugeot Citroën is the seventh largest French company. The factors and the motivating literature are presented in detail in the appendix.
The Causes of the Boycott
The boycott of French products in 2008 is only the latest in a long line of nationalist boycotts in China (Remer, 1979) . The boycotts we examine stem from events beginning in March 2008, when political unrest in Tibet over Chinese rule drew the attention of the foreign media. The consensus among internet users and the media in China was that foreign news reports-especially those from Europe-were biased against the Chinese government. Resentment against Europe built quickly in China. Over a brief period, several events related to Tibet stoked the fires of umbrage in China: French President Nicolas Sarkozy's decision to not attend the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Summer Olympic Games in August (March 25), protesters' disruption of the Olympic torch relay Paris (April 7), and the Paris city council making the Dalai Lama an honorary citizen (April 21). Each of these acts was generally interpreted by the Chinese people as a message of support for Tibetan independence (we describe them more fully in the appendix). In particular, the interference with the torch relay outraged much of the Chinese public, for the Olympics were a great source of national 4 A recent national survey found that one-third of Americans participated in a boycott during the past year (StrategyOne, "Voting With Their Wallets," April 19, 2010, http://www.pitchengine.com/strategyone/voting-with-their-wallets--/58625/). 5 Many Chinese sociologists argue that the Confucian concept of the primacy of social relationships underlies Chinese society and its emphasis on conformity and social harmony. As Stockman (2000, p.72) notes, "the [Chinese] self is often seen as seeking harmony with its social environment through conformity with its demands." While some critics caution against an "overConfucianized view of Chinese society" (King, 1985, p.60) , it is nevertheless a saying in China that "the nail that sticks up gets hammered down" (or more literally: "the bird which sticks its head out of the tree hole gets beaten down"). pride for the Chinese. A few months before the games, nearly eight out of ten Chinese (79%) said that the Olympics were important to them personally (Pew, 2008) . In the eyes of many Chinese, the actions by the French struck directly at the pride and great hopes of the nation.
Nationalist reaction in China to the Olympic torch mêlée in Paris was swift. Calls to boycott French products appeared on the internet on April 10, and within days a series of highly public demonstrations against French companies erupted. During the next few weeks, the boycott of French products, including French-branded automobiles, spread throughout China. Given the high visibility of the Peugeot and Citroën brands in China, French automobiles became a major target, and appeared in lists of brands to boycott in the internet. 6 Although the Chinese government initially attacked the supposed anti-Chinese bias of the foreign media in the first few weeks of April, it denounced the boycott on April 18 and curtailed demonstrations four days later. Despite the change in the official position, a poll of Chinese respondents conducted April 18-20 found that 60% "registered a growing dislike for France" and that 39% were in favor of "boycotting foreign merchandise such as those made in France." 7 Our results suggest that anti-French attitudes lasted through the Olympics. One article from the time quotes a man saying that he did not dare drive his Citroën during the time of the Olympics, for fear of it being smashed by protesters. Anti-French sentiment appeared to die down in China after the Olympic Games in August. However, on November 13, Sarkozy announced that he would meet with the Dalai Lama. The meeting occurred on December 6, and was reported in the official Chinese press as an expression of France's support for the separation of Tibetan territory from China. The Chinese government protested the action strongly, and the event again provoked a strong reaction among Chinese internet users, who renewed calls to boycott French products (Li and Qin, 2008) .
The precise timing of the boycotts is difficult to determine by the methods used in the economic boycott literature. Chavis and Leslie (2009) use the number of news articles on the event they study to measure the intensity of the call for the boycott. However, counting newspaper articles or measuring other media attention given to boycott activity presumes that media attention reflects the feelings and activities of consumers, which is less likely to be the case with China's state-controlled media. In fact, by the end of April the Chinese authorities 6 See http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_3d6eb30f01009ajc.html for one such list. The attention forced the manager of the Chinese company in joint venture with PSA Peugeot Citroën for the production of French automobiles, Dongfeng Shenlong, to make a clear statement of support for the Chinese government at the 2008 Beijing International Auto Show (http://space.foolcars.com/?uid-118-action-viewspace-itemid-1777). 7 The poll is reported in Zhou and Jia (2008) . 8 Auto.Huanqui.com, "Boycotting French Product may Hurt Citroën" (in Chinese), December 11, 2008 , http://auto.huanqiu.com/news/Manu/2008 actively sought to hinder the boycott through censoring. 9 Nonetheless, in the appendix we examine counts of newspaper articles related to the boycotts. There was a spate of articles in April 2008 at the time of the Olympic torch protests, which dwindled rapidly in succeeding months as the official position toward the boycott changed. A second spike in articles occurred in December 2008 in response to the meeting between Sarkozy and the Dalai Lama. Instead of relying directly on this evidence to determine the dates of the boycott in our empirical estimations, we instead adopt a flexible difference-in-difference specification that allows the data to show when sales of French automobiles dropped relative to other brands. Allowing this flexibility is especially important since automobiles are rare purchases for households compared to other goods such as wine studied in the boycott literature, and a consumer may not have immediate opportunity to express anti-French sentiment in the marketplace for vehicles.
The Target of the Boycott: French Branded Automobiles
China is now the largest motor vehicle market in the world, having surpassed Japan in production and the US in sales in 2009.
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The large majority of automobiles sold in China, including those with a foreign brand (e.g. Ford or Peugeot), are produced domestically. Foreign brands are produced by joint ventures between domestic firms and the foreign company, because Chinese law does not allow a foreign automobile manufacturer to produce vehicles on its own in China. The Chinese domestic partner must own the majority of the joint venture's stock. An irony of boycotting French automobiles, therefore, is that a Chinese company absorbs the largest part of the blow. In 2008, 28% of automobile sales were of Chinese brands, 65% were of domestically produced foreign brands, and the remaining 7% were of imports.
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Of the foreign brands manufactured in China, about one half are Korean and Japanese brands, and the rest are split equally between European and US brands. 9 Western correspondents in China reported that state censors were blocking text messages promoting the boycott and that certain Chinese-language internet search engines were returning blank pages in response to queries about the boycott, with messages stating that the searches "do not conform to relevant law and policy" (Andrew Jacobs, "Despite Boycott Threat, a French Retailer's Aisles Are Far From Empty in China," The New York Times, May 2, 2008, p. A-6). 10 Production data are from the OICA, available at http://oica.net/category/production-statistics/, and include both passenger cars and commercial vehicles. Sales data are from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM), quoted in Reuters, "China car sales top U.S," January 11, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60A1BQ20100111. 11 The monthly market share of imported vehicles peaks at under 7% during our sample period. An additional one to two points of market share goes to "complete knock downs," vehicles largely assembled abroad and imported in an incomplete state for final assembly in China.
Automobiles we treat as "French" in our data are the 19 models produced domestically by Dongfeng Peugeot Citroën Automobile Company (DPCAC). DPCAC is a joint venture between a domestic Chinese automaker and PSA Peugeot Citroën, the French manufacturer of vehicles sold in the Peugeot and Citroën lines, the two French brands produced in China. We calculate that Peugeot and Citroën composed 2.6% of total sales in 2008.
Until the global economic crisis hit the Chinese automobile market in mid 2008, the industry had experienced phenomenal growth. Figure 1 shows that the year-on-year growth rates were over 20% from 2005 through 2007. Growth slowed in 2008 due to the weaker economy, although sales were still up 6.7% for the year, which was the lowest rate of increase in 10 years.
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Although the Chinese government instituted tax cuts and subsidies to stimulate the automobile market, these were not in place until late January, 2009, 13 and so do not affect sales during the boycott period we examine most carefully (quarters two through four of 2008).
12 Per CAAM, quoted in China Daily, "China's 2008 auto sales growth hits 10-year low," January 12, 2009, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-01/12/content_7390508.htm. 13 Furthermore, the stimulus measures were targeted to smaller-engine cars regardless of manufacturer, and thus apply to French branded cars as well as others. See Fei (2009) . The sales data for our analysis is obtained from Emerging Market Information Service (EMIS). These data include monthly sales data by model on all domestically produced non-commercial passenger automobiles marketed in China from December 2004 through the first quarter of 2009. The EMIS data also includes data on imports, but these data are not broken out by model. Since only a small portion of cars sold in China is imported, we group imports together in our estimations.
Characteristics of the vehicles are collected from the website of PCauto, one of the largest automobile portals in China. The power of the automobile is measured with the engine size, acceleration (the time in seconds needed to reach 100 kilometers (km) per hour (kph) from a standstill), and top speed (in kph). The size of the vehicle is measured by its dimensions (length, width, and height in meters), its luggage space (in liters), and the number of seats. The fuel efficiency is measured by the number of liters needed to drive 100 km. The final attribute is the capacity of the fuel tank (in liters). For the brand level data, the attributes of the models are aggregated by calculating the quantity-weighted average.
The average characteristics of vehicles by nationality of the brand are presented in Figure 2 and Table 1. 14 April 2008, the start of the boycott period, is marked with a vertical line on each graph in the figure. The figures reveal that French models occupy a middle ground in the product space. Compared to Chinese models, French brands on average are larger vehicles with highercapacity engines that are less fuel-efficient but can accelerate faster and reach much higher speeds. This is mainly because Chinese vehicles have minuscule engines, use little fuel, cannot go very fast, have poor acceleration, and are tiny (by Western standards). However, in comparison to brands from nations other than China, French models are the most fuel efficient, and have the smallest engines, length, and width. Notwithstanding, they do not fare the worst with respect to top speed or acceleration. Given differences among models and brands, we control for vehicle attributes in several ways in the estimations. incomplete. However, prices do not play an important role in our analysis because we do not attempt to identify a demand curve for automobiles, and we examine the incomplete price data only informally. The lack of price data does prevent us from examining the impact of the boycotts on automakers' revenue.
Sales Trends
We begin by looking at sales trends for French and other automobiles sold in China. The sales gap narrows a bit in September, and then widens again in OctoberDecember. November and December 2008, marked as Boycott 2, correspond to the second boycott called in response to the Sarkozy-Dalai Lama conference. After December, the sales gap narrows again. Although Figure 3 suggests that the boycotts may have been responsible for the lost sales of French automobiles relative to others, there are other factors to examine before a conclusion can be drawn. In the next section, we formalize the investigation of differences in sales of French cars over time and relative to other brands with a difference-in-difference model. We also control for the average characteristics of each brand's fleet and for non-linear time trends, and consider an alternative matched sample for estimation of sales at the model level.
There is no publicly available source of comprehensive price data for automobiles sold in China. We gather limited price data from two sources: EMIS and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, China's organization for central planning and management of the economy). Prices are unavailable for many models. Neither data source covers prices of all models. Even when there is price data for a model the monthly coverage is often
Figure 3: Sales of French and Other Automobiles
Before and After the Boycotts brands. While in theory this redistribution of market share affects the interpretation of our difference-in-difference estimates, the issue turns out empirically to be essentially ignorable, as we demonstrate in the appendix.
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15 Identification of the impacts of treatment effects in difference-in-difference models usually rests on the assumption that the change in market share between the pre-and post-boycott periods for the control group (the non-French brands) is unaffected by the boycott. In our application, however, if French brands lose market share, then the market share of non-French brands must increase. In the appendix, we show that the empirical implications of this do not significantly affect the interpretation of the difference-in-difference estimates (see section A8 there). 
Econometric Model
The choice of dependent variable for the estimations involves several considerations. First is the choice between market share and sales levels. We use market shares for the dependent variable in most of our estimations, but also explore the quantities sold in alternative specifications. When the dependent variable is market share in the main estimations, we use the level instead of the log, since log market share is left-skewed. Furthermore, the level of market share is more natural for examining substitution patterns because when a French brand loses a point of market share, that point must be distributed directly to other during the observation window that identifying differences in sales trends over time from sales of specific models is fraught with problems caused by composition bias. Furthermore, it is natural to aggregate to the brand level since the boycott targeted automobiles based on the origin of the brand (French), and not specific models. For our main estimations the dependent variable y it is taken to be the quantity market share of sales of automobile brand i in month t, expressed on a 100-point scale. As an additional check on the robustness of our results, we estimate one specification using model level sales, where we avoid composition bias by creating a matched sample of models. The remaining question is how to model the impact of the boycott. Instead of arbitrarily assigning a group of months to a dummy variable for a boycott indicator, we adopt a flexible specification that, while assuming that the boycott began in April 2008 at the earliest, makes no assumptions about how long it lasted and allows its impact to vary non-parametrically month to month. The model for the estimation is:
where  i and  t are fixed effects for brand i and month t, respectively; x it is a vector of average vehicle characteristics of a brand in a period, and  it is the econometric error term. In our full sample, t runs from 1 (December 2004) to 52 (March 2009), although in most specifications we use months 27 (April 2007) to 52. The shorter period, which includes one complete year before and after the initial call for a boycott of French products in April 2008 (month 41), is chosen for two reasons. It reduces the turnover of models in the sample, which alleviates potential problems of composition bias. The shorter span also limits the sample to periods in which total sales of automobiles are more comparable. As depicted in Figure 1 , the sales from 2007 on are more comparable than are the earlier years. The brand fixed effects  incorporate all differences across brands in average automobile attributes, effects of advertising, and other supply and demand factors, as well as any other factor affecting market share that does not change over time. The time fixed effects  remove month-to-month changes in the market share of an average firm. If the number of brands never changed, there would be no changes over time in average market share. 17 However, the number 17 In particular, with N brands offered each month, average market share would be 1/N each month and there would be no need for time fixed effects.
Another question is whether to define the unit of observation to be a specific model of automobile (e.g., the Peugeot 307) or the brand (e.g., Peugeot). While previous studies of boycotts using sales microdata used a single product as the unit of observation (Chavis and Leslie, 2009; Ashenfelter et al., 2007) , we choose the brand for our main estimations. 16 Enough models appear or disappear 16 As noted above, the one exception is that imports are grouped into one "brand" for analysis.
The term of interest is  t B it , which captures the impact of the boycott on the market share of French automobiles. The variable B it equals one when brand i is French (Citroën or Peugeot) and t  41 (the potential boycott period); B it is zero otherwise. Thus, the  t (which is identically set to zero for months before the boycott) compose the set of difference-in-difference coefficients for the months of the boycott. That is,  t measures the change in market share of French automobiles during the months of the boycott, relative to sales of French cars before the boycott, and net of changes in the market share of non-French brands. By including average vehicle characteristics x it , the difference-in-difference coefficients are also net of changes due to the composition effects of the attributes of the fleet sold in the month for a brand.
It is important to note that equation (1) is not a demand equation, but instead is a reduced form equation for market share in equilibrium. Thus,  t does not merely measure the impact of the boycott on consumer demand, but also incorporates the influence of price changes. In that sense, the estimates from the reduced form model measure the total effect of the boycott, including any supplyside responses of the firms. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest 19 that the boycotts led the struggling French brands to lower prices. We examine prices later in the paper. However, to the extent that prices were lowered to prop up sales of French automobiles, any impacts the difference-in-difference estimates reveal on the quantity demanded are lower bounds on the actual impact on the demand function. If the automobile sales market were competitive, this is tantamount to saying that if the supply curve has a positive slope, then changes in the quantity demanded in equilibrium understate the amount by which the demand curve shifted to the left, since the new equilibrium is farther down the supply curve. Since (1) is a reduced form equation, we also have no expectation for (and will not report or interpret) the signs for the vehicle characteristics, since the estimated  will incorporate both demand for the attributes as well as supply side cost factors.
18 Strictly speaking, as described above the variable B it captures only French cars produced domestically in China. 19 A salesman at a Citroën dealership in Beijing told reporters that despite "huge discounts" sales were less than half of what they were the previous year. See Global Auto Sources Automotive News, "Tensions may push Citroën sales down in China," December 11, 2008, available at http://autonews.gasgoo.com/auto-news/1008686/Tensions-may-push-Citroen-sales-down-inChina.html. of brands does change during the period we examine, and so the time fixed effects control for changes in average market share due to changes in brands offered for sale. Including  also allows the interpretation of  t as a set of difference-indifference coefficients. The first column shows the estimated boycott effects and its robust standard error. The second column expresses the impact in percentage terms of sales.
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In estimation 1, only the time and period fixed effects are included. The estimated difference-in-difference coefficients for the potential boycott period,  41 - 52 , display the quintessential pattern that we generally find in all estimations using the brand-level data. The coefficients are depicted in Figure 4 with the black 20 Although previous papers examining boycotts with sales microdata (Chavis and Leslie, 2009; Ashenfelter et al., 2007) apparently did not do so, clustering on the unit of observation in the calculation of standard errors, which relaxes the assumption of independence among observations from different periods for the same unit, is now standard practice for panel data to avoid overstating the significant of estimates (see section 21.2.3 of Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . 21 The percentage impacts are calculated as follows. Using the fitted values from the regression, sum those for the French brands to calculate estimated French market share M t in all boycott months. Then calculate the counterfactual French market share C t using the regression coefficients with B it set to zero. The figures reported in the second column for each estimation in Table1 are Markers are for coefficients significant at the 5% level. Shaded areas cover the two boycott periods.
Basic Estimation Results
The estimated effects of the boycott movement on French automobiles are displayed in Table 2 . There are three estimations in Table 2 , varying in the controls included in the specification. In all estimations, the standard errors are line. There appear to be two distinct phases to the impacts of the boycotts. The first boycott, beginning in April 2008, has little apparent effect at first. Although the French brands lose about 0.17 points of market share (all figures are on a 100-point scale) in April and May, which represents a loss of about 9% of their sales, the estimates are not significant. The size of the negative impact grows steadily through August 2008, when the Olympic Games were held in Beijing, so that by August the French brands have lost a half point of market share. The lost sales represent a 25% reduction in sales relative to the counterfactual without the boycott. The impacts are significant at the 10% level for May, at the 5% level for June, and at the 1% level for July and August. After the Olympics, although French sales are still down in September and October, the impacts are not large enough to be significant. The effect of the second boycott against French products, spurred by the announcement in November that Sarkozy planned to meet with the Dalai Lama, is large and significant that month and in December, when the meeting occurred. French market share is down more than a half point in both those months, which is 26-28% of sales. After this sharp but brief downturn in the last two months of 2008, the impacts become small enough to lose significance. The pattern estimation 1 reveals, that of a first boycott gaining strength and lasting through the Olympics and a second boycott in response to the Sarkozy-Dalai Lama meeting, is remarkably robust to alternative specifications. To begin with, in results not shown, we re-estimated specification 1 with all months of data, and found a similar pattern.
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We also checked the onset of the boycott period by reestimating specification 1 with a  t for March 2008 (in effect, pushing the boycott period back one month). As expected, the difference-in-difference coefficient for March 2008 is statistically indistinguishable from zero, which provides evidence that the results are not driven by trends in the gap between market shares of French and other brands unrelated to the boycotts. Next, in estimation 2 in Table  2 , we include the variables measuring the average characteristics related to vehicle size, power, fuel efficiency, and capacity. Adding the vehicle characteristics to the regression entails a small loss in sample size, since they are not available for a few observations. We also add a variable that absorbs the fuel cost of operating the vehicle by interacting the indicator variables for the month with the average fuel consumption of the brand. The addition of these characteristics helps remove the effects of quality changes on the market shares. 22 The difference-in-difference coefficients in the alternative estimation with the entire sample (months 1 through 52) display the same pattern over the boycott year but are even larger. The coefficient starts at -0.3 in April, rises monotonically to -0.7 in August, drops in September and October, rises to its highest level in November (-0.67) and December (-0.70), and falls in the last three months. As in estimation 1, the coefficients for July, August, November, and December are statistically significant at the 1% level.
The pattern of the level and significance of the boycott effects is the same as in estimation 1, although the size of the impacts is generally larger, particularly for the second boycott.
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The coefficient of -0.62 for December corresponds to almost a one-third decrease in sales. We also explored a variant of estimation 2 with the calendar month interacted with the country of the brand, to account for seasonality. The results (estimation 7 in the appendix) for the D-D coefficients follow the same patterns as estimation 2, although the coefficients' magnitudes and p-values are larger.
In specification 3 in Table 2 , we take into account country specific time trends of sales. This is to rule out the possibility that the estimated negative boycott effects in the estimations merely reflect a longer-term downward trend in sales of French automobiles, relative to other countries' brands. To better estimate the pre-boycott trends, estimation 3 includes the full data set spanning more than four years, which nearly doubles the sample size from estimation 2. The modified model adds quadratic country-specific trends as follows:
where k indexes the country of origin (or the group of imports) of brand i, and t is the month, which takes values from 1 to 52. The other notation is as in equation (1). The results in the last columns of Table 2 display the same pattern as found above in both size and significance, showing the effects of the two boycotts. The coefficients for the background trend for French automobile share are neither singly nor jointly significant. However, the estimated percentage impacts of the boycott are larger than in the previous estimations. The results show that when correcting for any trend of French automobiles before the boycotts (as well as trends in other countries' sales), sales were 15-26% lower in June-August 2008 and were 31-33% lower in November-December 2008.
23 When all months are included in Estimation 2, the results display the same pattern over the boycott year (steady building toward a local maximum in August, large impacts in November and December, etc.) but are even larger. The same coefficients that are significant at the 1% level in Table1, and only those, are significant at the 1% level in the regression with the entire sample. 24 Letting y it be quantity sold, brand market share is then z it = y it /y t , where y t is total market quantity in month t. Thus log(y it ) = log(z it ) + log(y t ), and since log(y t ) is absorbed by the period fixed effects, regressing either log(y it ) or log(z it ) yields the same coefficients  t for the boycott. The estimation method is OLS, with std. errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on brands (in estimations 4 and 5) or models (in estimation 6). All specifications include two-way fixed effects for brand and month.. boycott effects are generally larger in these estimations than in the corresponding estimation 1.
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The impacts range from an approximate 22-37% sales loss in the months of the first boycott (June-August) to a 35-45% sales loss during the second boycott (November-December).
Alternative Specificat ion: Non-Chinese Sample
In specification 5, we address another potential concern. Even though we control for average vehicle characteristics in estimations 2 and 3 above, it may nonetheless be the case that the non-French automobiles are too different to serve as an adequate control group. Another possibility is that attributes of French and other vehicles diverge over time in such a way that leads Chinese consumers away from purchasing French automobiles. For example, perhaps changing tastes for vehicle characteristics or fuel efficiency disproportionately disadvantaged French models. The latter consideration may be especially important given that the price of fuel changed during our sample period. The state-controlled price of fuel shipped from the refineries was unchanged from November 2007 to June 2008, when an unexpected 17-18% price increase was approved in response to rapidly rising world oil prices. Although world oil prices fell sharply after July, the official national price of gasoline did not change until it was cut by 14% on December 18 (Lee, 2008) . The time fixed effects included in all estimations and their interaction with the brand average fuel consumption in estimation 2 control for the impact of fuel prices on overall sales. Nevertheless, it may yet be a possibility that if French-branded vehicles are less fuel efficient than others, we may be mistaken in attributing the reduced sales of French vehicles in June through August 2008 to the first boycott.
To investigate this possibility, we first note from Figure 2 that French vehicles did not undergo radical or even marked changes in characteristics during 2008 that could explain sales differentials by themselves. However, as noted 25 When all months are included in Estimation 4, the results display the same pattern over the boycott year (steady building toward the local maximum in July and August, large impacts in November and December, etc.) but are even larger. Of the three coefficients that are significant at the 1% level in Table 3 , the one for June drops to the 5% level. In addition, the coefficient for August gains significance at the 5% level and that for November gains significance at the 1% level in the regression with the entire sample.
Alternative Specification: Log Sales
As an additional check on the results, we rerun estimation 1 with the dependent variable redefined to be the number of vehicles sold of brand i in month t, in logs. This choice for y it is equivalent to regressing the log market share.
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The results, estimation 4 in Table 3 , display the same pattern found in our main set of estimations. Sales are down in both boycott periods. The magnitudes of the were driving demand away from larger automobiles toward Chinese models, the French brands should be affected least.
Nevertheless, Figure 2 makes clear that the average Chinese vehicle differs from the foreign-branded automobiles. Thus, in estimation 5 (in Table 3 ) we sharpen the control group not only by controlling for vehicle attributes but also by dropping Chinese brands. Dropping the Chinese brands reduces the sample size by more than half. The results again display the usual pattern. 26 We conclude that the change in relative demand for brands found in the estimations is not driven primarily by characteristics that change over time or by demand factors related to the relative importance of vehicle attributes but unrelated to the boycotts.
Alternative Specification: Matched Sample
The identification strategy used in estimations 1-4 relies on comparing the sales trends of French automobiles and other brands sold in China. We refined this approach in estimation 5 to check whether dropping Chinese vehicles changed our basic conclusions, and found that it did not. There remains the question of whether the average vehicle characteristics used in estimations 2 and 5 cause aggregation bias or otherwise lead to results that would not arise from a more closely matched control group. To address these possibilities we create an estimation sample using monthly model-level sales figures. The sample includes all 19 French models sold between April 2007 and March 2009. Matched to each of these models are observations for the same months on the three non-French models that are most similar to the French automobile.
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Matching creates a control group that is composed of the models that most closely resemble the French vehicles, removing possible divergence of vehicle attributes in the sample 26 When all months are included in Estimation 5, the results display the same pattern over the boycott year but are somewhat larger, except for December, where the coefficient falls slightly to -0.75. December still has the only coefficient significant at the 1% level. 27 Thus, we use a "nearest neighbors" matching technique. We chose the three nearest neighbors because Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) state that using a single match, while giving the least bias, entails a loss of precision in the estimates. Results from using the nearest one, two, and four matches were essentially similar, although those with fewer than three matches had larger standard errors. Notwithstanding, the coefficients for at least the second boycott period were always significant at the five percent level.
thrifty Chinese "econoboxes" (or stable preferences and declining income during the worsening global recession during 2008) explains the French decline. However, given that French brands are the smallest and most fuel efficient of the non-Chinese fleets, it would appear that if taste for fuel efficiency or vehicle size above, French models tend to be less fuel efficient than Chinese models. The comparison opens the door to the possibility that a shift in preferences toward over time. To make the matches consistent during the sample period, a non-characteristics in the data.
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Matching is performed with replacement (to better the quality of the match and reduce bias), and so some of the non-French models are matched to more than one French model. The difference-in-difference specification from equation (1) is used, although since fixed effects for the models (as well as for the month) are included there is no need to include vehicle characteristics as additional regressors. The dependent variable is log sales.
The results from the matched sample are in Table 3 , labeled Estimation 6. The coefficients are also depicted in Figure 4 with the gray dashed line. Since the scale of the coefficients differs from Estimation 1 (which was for brand level market share), the results from Estimation 6 (for model level sales) plotted in Figure 4 have an alternate scale. This allows the similarity in the overall shape of the patterns to be clearly discerned: the same general pattern found in the brand level estimations persists. The decline in sales begins immediately in April with a 25% reduction in sales relative to the matched models and to sales before the boycott period (and, unlike the previous estimations, the decline is significant). The sales trend continues to head downward during May and June. The two slight differences between these results and those from the previous estimations are that the sales decline reaches a plateau earlier (in June 2008) and holds it one month later (through September), and that sales do not drop as much after the Olympics. For the first boycott period, five of the six difference-in-difference coefficients (those for April through September) are significant at the 10% level or better. At the plateau during June through September, the coefficients are in the range of -1.0 to -1.1, which implies losses of French-branded sales of more than 100% relative to sales of the control group.
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The strongest impacts, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance, are seen again for the second boycott period, with coefficients of -1.3 for November and -1.5 for December. In summary, the results from the matched sample of individual model sales strongly bolster the findings from the main estimations. 28 The Mahalanobis metric, the most commonly used distance metric in the non-propensity score matching literature (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, p.38) , is based on the inverse of the covariance matrix of the characteristics. Letting a and b be two column vectors of characteristics, and C be the sample covariance matrix of the characteristics estimated from the data, we measure the distance between a and b as (ab)C 1 (ab). 29 Losses in French sales can be greater than 100% because sales of the control group were trending up during this period. That is, with a log-linear differences-in-differences specification it need not be surprising to find coefficients less than -1. For example, if sales in the control group rise 50% and sales in the treatment group decrease by 75%, then the difference-in-difference coefficient would be less than -1.
French model is eligible for matching a French model only if it was offered in the market every month the French model was (since the point of the approach is to avoid bias due to changes in the composition of the control group). The metric for similarity is the Mahalanobis distance in the space of the 11 vehicle susceptibility of each model to a nationalistic boycott. For example, if Chinese consumers viewed some models as more characteristically "French" than others, we would expect to find greater sales losses for those automobiles. While we were not able to find any marketing surveys on such attitudes, we can identify two mechanisms by which the boycotts may have had heterogeneous impacts on models. The marketing literature finds that household income and consumer ethnocentrism-the propensity to buy domestic goods over foreign goods-are negatively correlated in many countries, including China.
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The link between consumer ethnocentrism and income suggests that a nationalistic boycott should affect automobile models that are more expensive less than cheaper models. Furthermore, other research finds that consumer ethnocentrism is moderated when the domestic goods are of relatively lower quality than the foreign goods (Wang and Chen, 2004) . Assuming that price and quality are positively correlated, this second mechanism also leads to the prediction that higher priced models will have smaller sales losses.
Due to the incomplete nature of our price data, we cannot explore this hypothesis fully. However, Peugeot on average appears to be a higher quality, higher price brand in China than Citroën. We repeat the matched sample estimation, but allow the coefficients for the two French brands to differ (results and additional details are in the appendix). Although the overall statistical evidence is not the strongest, the results suggest that higher income consumers, who were both more likely to buy Peugeots and less likely to be nationalistic, were less likely to allow the boycotts to affect their purchase decisions. We approach the same idea-that lower priced cars may be affected more if the sales reductions are due to nationalism-by splitting the French models into low, mid, and high price categories. The estimation results (in the appendix) show that the bulk of the results are insignificant, but at least are generally in accord with the predictions from the literature on consumer ethnocentrism.
Prices during the Boycotts
As mentioned above, equations (1) and (2) are reduced form, and as such do not include prices. Although our price data are too incomplete to add them to our econometric investigation, we can still visually examine pricing trends. Average prices of the fleets sold each month for French and other brands are shown in the top panel of Figure 5 , and the difference in prices between the two groups is in the 30 See Johnston (2004) for the result for Chinese consumers, and Wall and Heslop (1986) and Lee et al. (2003) and citations therein for similar results for North American consumers.
Heterogeneity of Boycott Impacts Among French Models
To provide further evidence that the relative reduction in sales of French automobiles was due to the boycotts, it would be useful to be able to measure the
Figure 5: Price trends, in levels and difference
Before the boycott period, both price levels were falling and the price differential fluctuated widely. Starting in March 2008, a large, persistent price gap opens between French and other brands, with the French brands being cheaper. The price gap remains largely the same during the first boycott period, until French vehicles' prices rise sharply in September after the Olympics at the same time that the prices of non-French brands are falling. Whether the drop in prices of French vehicles is due to the boycott cannot be demonstrated, but the pattern is at least consistent with a reduction in demand.
During the second boycott, the price gap between French and other brands narrows a bit in November but widens greatly in December. Given that December 2008 had the largest estimated negative impact of any of the boycott months, the price movement is again consistent with (but does not prove) declining demand for French automobiles. prices are not quality-adjusted, some of the movement is due to composition effects, and there are many missing data, a few general observations can be made.
bottom panel. Although caution is in order when interpreting the trends, since the
Substitution Patterns
The results to this point show that the market share and prices of French automobiles fell during the boycott periods, but apart from coincident timing do not prove that the boycotts were responsible. In this section, we offer further evidence suggesting that the boycotts triggered the sales declines. When consumers boycott French brands, their most likely alternative action is to switch to substitute brands of other origin (we consider intertemporal substitution below). Given the patriotic nature of the protests in China, one would expect that Chinese automobile sales would benefit from the boycotts. Furthermore, in the impressions of many Chinese people, the Western media displayed an unfriendly attitude toward the Chinese government's policies, and so one would expect that in general substitution would be to automobiles from non-Western countries. Indeed, polls at the time indicated that the anti-French attitudes spilled over into wide-scale anti-European/Western sentiment.
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Another reason why many Chinese may have conflated their views of France and Europe is that France held the rotating presidency of the EU at the time. One instance of such conflation occurred when the Chinese government responded to the French president's action in December by canceling a China-EU summit scheduled for that month.
If the decline in sales of French brands is unrelated to the boycotts, then there is no particular reason that,after controlling for vehicle attributes, Chinese brands should benefit disproportionately. Chinese vehicles are not the closest matches in product space to French automobiles: in the matching performed for the estimation described above, Japanese and Korean vehicles are the best matches to the French models. Of the set of best matches for each French model, 49% of the matched models are Japanese or Korean, followed by 21% from China. Similarly, apart from the anti-Western sentiment in China surrounding the Tibet incidents, there is no apparent reason that other Western brands would not pick up as much market share as Asian brands.
To investigate substitution among brands, we rewrite the model to include interactions between time and the country for the boycott period. To reduce the number of coefficients to be estimated, countries and time periods are grouped. The country groups are France, other Western European countries, China, other Asian countries, the US, and a residual "other" group including imports and Czech automobiles. Since we are interested in examining where lost sales of French brands go during the peak boycott periods revealed in the previous regressions, we group the time periods for the D-D coefficients into boycott 31 One poll in April 2008 found that 86% of Chinese respondents said they "tended to believe in the reports of domestic media while those who were inclined to believe the Western media accounted for only 2 percent" (Zhou and Jia, 2008) . A survey shortly after the torch relay showed that attitudes of Chinese respondents fell toward the UK and Germany, as well as toward France (Zhou and Jia, 2008) . Attitudes toward the US were not reported. 
where B kb is an indicator variable taking value one when brand i is from country group k and the month is in boycott period b. In equation (3), the term involving B therefore allows the impact of the boycott during its peak months to differ among countries of brand origin. For identification, France is the excluded country when defining the B kb in equation (3) (so that  kb = 0 for French brands). With this specification, the  for the non-French countries show the change in market share relative to the change for the French brands. Given the declining overall sales level during 2008, as mentioned above in the discussion of Figure 3 , a reallocation of French market share to brands of other origin may mean only that other brands lost fewer customers than French brands. The results are in Figure 6 and Table 4 . Instead of reporting the coefficients directly from the regression, which pertain to the brand-level sales, Estimates are the points of market share gained by brands belonging to the countries given in the column title, net of changes in the market share of French brands (both relative to trends), and are summed to represent the totals for brands from the country or group of countries. The figures are based on an estimation including vehicle characteristics, including fuel efficiency interacted with time, and two-way fixed effects for brand and month. The specification is based on equation (3) in the text. Std. errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering on brands, and the confidence intervals in the table are calculated from them using the delta method.
the figures in the table and figure have been adjusted to approximate the total market shares for the country or country group. For example, the coefficient for Chinese brands in boycott period 1 is multiplied by the average number of Chinese brands during the period divided by the number of French brands. Since there are 14 times as many Chinese brands as French brands, multiplying the coefficient by 14 scales the brand-for-brand figure up to an approximation of the relative gains in market share for Chinese brands as a whole. The results confirm the conjecture that Chinese brands would gain the most market share from the French brands, and that other Western brands would gain little. During the first boycott phase, Chinese automobiles altogether gained of the most market share relative to French brands in the months leading up to the Olympics in August, around 3.4 points. Cars from other Asian countries (Japan and Korea) gained about 2.8 points.
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The coefficients for automobiles from 32 It is not surprising that boycotters would also turn to Japanese and Korean automobiles, since Chinese officials were careful to include the rest of Asia in a spirit of cooperation in preparation for the Olympics. A Chinese Olympics official stated that the "Beijing 2008 Olympics is not only the glory of China, but also the glory of Asia," and Japan and Korea were strong supporters of the Western European countries other than France (Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK) and from the US are all positive but insignificant during the summer boycott. Given that French market share fell during that time, we therefore do not reject the hypothesis that brands from other Western countries suffered just as much, although given the wide confidence intervals the tests may not have much power. We explore further in the appendix whether other Western brands were equally targeted in the boycotts, and conclude that they were not. The situation is largely similar during the second boycott phase. Chinese brands gain 12 points of market share during November and December, other Asian brands gain 8.3 points, and other Western European brands gain a small but statistically significant amount. Changes in US market share are positive but again statistically indistinguishable from those for France.
Since automobiles are durable goods and represent a major purchasing decision for most households, intertemporal substitution is another possibility for buyers. That is, consumers who want to purchase a Peugeot or a Citroën may delay their purchase to temporarily support the boycott but still buy their desired vehicle after the furor subsided. If intertemporal substitution were responsible for the large, significant decreases in market share during the boycotts found in estimations 1-5, then we would expect to see positive coefficients in those estimations for non-boycott months after April 2008 (i.e., September and October 2008 and January-March 2009 ). An examination of the coefficients for those months shown in Table 2 reveals no evidence of substitution of this sort. Not only are there no significant positive increases in market share during those months, the coefficients are in fact all (with one insignificant exception) negative.
Additional Evidence from Global Sales
While the boycott impacts documented above appear to be highly robust, one may wish to compare the experience of French automobiles in the Chinese market with their sales in other countries. For example, perhaps the sales decline is related more to PSA Peugeot Citroën than to a boycott in China. One could imagine estimating a triple-differences model, where the difference-in-difference (DID) impacts in China are themselves differenced from equivalent DID estimates from another Asian country. However, Peugeot and Citroën are not domestically produced and have minuscule market shares as imports elsewhere in Asia, and in any event, the sales data required to perform such an estimation at the brand or model level are not available to us. Nonetheless, we can check to see if the sales experience in 2008 in China for PSA Peugeot Citroën at the market level was atypical. We gathered data from PSA Peugeot Citroën's annual report on the automobile markets where the company has significant operations: Western Europe, Latin America, Russia, and China. 33 Table 5 shows the percentage change in sales for the national automobile market and for the company, as well as the difference between the two figures. The data show that the poor sales performance (both absolutely and relative to competitors) during 2008 in China was highly atypical. In China, sales of Peugeots and Citroëns were down 14.1% in 2008 compared to the year previous, while the automobile market grew 5.1% year-on-year, for a difference-in-differences of -19.2%.
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In no other country or region did sales of the French brands decline while sales in the market generally increased. In fact, in most parts of the world, PSA Peugeot Citroën outperformed the market, and only in the U.K. and Argentina (apart from China) is the relative sales loss greater than 5% (where it is 5.4% and 5.3%, respectively). Thus, 33 PSA Peugeot Citroën, 2008 Annual Results, available at http://www.psa-peugeotcitroen.com/document/publication/PSA%20RA%20POUR%20MISE%20EN%20LIGNE%20UK %2017%2002%20091236112041.pdf. We include every country and region listed in the report. 34 The sales statistics cover both passenger vehicles and light commercial vehicles, and so are not directly comparable to our microdata. the19.2% sales losses relative to other brands in China is at least three and a half times higher than the sales losses are in any other major market for the company. An informal triple-differencing, computing by subtracting the other regions' DID figures from the Chinese DID (shown in the final column of the table) returns excess sales losses by the French brands in China ranging from 13.5% (with respect to the UK) to 72.6% (with respect to Russia). These results show that companywide problems with PSA Peugeot Citroën cannot account for the Chinese sales declines in 2008.
Conclusion
The investigation of the brand and model level data with the difference-indifference methodology uncovers a robust pattern of boycott effects on sales of French automobiles in China during 2008. The effects of the first wave of marketmediated protest, triggered by the disruption of the Olympic torch relay in Paris, started small but grew steadily through the month of the Beijing Olympics. The second wave, occurring in November and December of 2008 when the French President met with the Dalai Lama, was shorter yet sharper in impact. Our results show that the impact of the boycotts is substantial: market share of French automobile brands fell 25-33% over the two boycotts, relative to trends for other brands. The supplementary estimations looking at brand log sales return even larger magnitudes, with boycott impacts of up to -78%. Evidence from a matched sample at the model level points toward the largest estimates of all, of up to a difference-in-differences impact of -151%. We also find clear evidence that Chinese consumers substituted away from French brands mostly toward Chinese brands, toward other Asian brands to a lesser extent, but little toward other Western automobile brands, in accord with the nationalistic nature of the boycotts.
Our research design enables us to dismiss many alternative explanations for the decline in sales of French automobiles in 2008. By including time fixed effects, we are able to rule out potential alternative causes that would affect the sales of all brands equally, even if the unobserved factors change over time. The difference-in-difference strategy additionally rules out potential alternative causes that would affect the change in sales of all brands equally. The results are not sensitive to the span of the sample, whether it is the balanced two-year sample used in most estimations or the complete dataset. Differences in vehicle attributes among brands or models, or between Chinese and other vehicles, do not appear to drive the results. Any alternative explanation involving fuel prices or changing tastes for economy must confront the fact that vehicles from Korea and Japan, which gained market share from French brands, have worse fuel efficiency. Similarly, any alternative explanation involving the impact of the global financial crisis on income or consumer confidence must confront the fact that, on average, French cars have lower prices than others (see Figure 6 ). In fact, our matched sample that most directly ensures the comparability of the control group of automobiles yields the largest boycott impacts of all. Changes in foreign exchange rates do not cause omitted variable bias, for if we add them to the estimations in Table 2 they change the coefficients little and are insignificant themselves (see section A7 in the appendix). Finally, the French automaker that collaborates with the domestic firm (Dongfeng Shenlong) to produce the vehicles in China experienced such large sales declines nowhere else in the world at the time.
We cannot incontrovertibly rule out that there is another reason such as quality changes causing the lost sales. However, our search of the Chinese trade press did not uncover explanations besides the boycotts that would have caused Chinese consumers to stop buying French brands precisely when nationalistic fervor was at its peak. In the face of the evidence presented here, Occam's razor indicates that the boycotts, as the simplest explanation, are likely to be the correct one. However, it would be incorrect to view our results as isolating the causal impact of a call to boycott in the abstract. The Chinese boycotts were both a product of and a contributor to the underlying nationalistic sentiment. Without the perceived provocations and the emotional responses they engendered in many Chinese consumers, the boycotts would likely have had little effect.
Even though the French companies owned less than half of the joint venture that produced Citroëns and Peugeots in China, the empirical results suggest that many Chinese consumers viewed these brands as French. An ironic result of the second boycott, which was prompted directly by diplomatic actions of the French government, is that the larger part of the blow fell on Dongfeng, a Chinese firm. One response of the automakers would be to pursue a business strategy to invest in brand localization to stave off future episodes of losing profit over diplomatic incidents out of the firm's control. In the US, for example, Toyota has chosen to "Americanize" both to better appeal to consumers here and to insulate itself against political reprisals stemming from success at the expense of the Detroit auto companies (Taylor, 2003) .
To the extent that Chinese consumers viewed the boycott as instrumental, the market-mediated protests appear to have been successful. In April 2009, China and France resumed a spirit of economic cooperation and agreed to restore high-level diplomatic contact following the quarrel over Tibet. France furthermore pledged not to support Tibetan independence (Bodeen, 2009) . Scholars have previously noted that boycotts can serve as surrogate regulation, substituting for formal governmental intervention in the market (e.g., Gunningham et al., 1999) . However, the context of this line of inquiry in the literature has been regulation of product safety or environmental damage. In the case we examine, the government did not support the boycotts at the times they had the largest impact on sales, probably because it feared counter-boycotts of Chinese goods abroad and certainly because it realized that international trade and FDI are not zero-sum games. The boycotts were one factor among several, no doubt, causing France to re-evaluate its position. China was also exerting diplomatic and economic pressure by canceling an EU summit and shunning France while on investment missions in Europe (Bodeen, 2009) . Nevertheless, by suggesting that boycotts can help achieve their ultimate goals, even when those goals involve foreign policy and relations between nations, our work implies that commerce can be an effective weapon, even when wielded through the means of private collective action. In short, our answer to the question posed by Ashenfelter et al. (2007) is that politics-at least in this case-really did affect commerce.
